Self-Protecting Documents for Cloud Storage Security by Munier, Manuel et al.
HAL Id: hal-00736133
https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00736133
Submitted on 20 Jan 2020
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non,
émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de
recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires
publics ou privés.
Self-Protecting Documents for Cloud Storage Security
Manuel Munier, Vincent Lalanne, Magali Ricarde
To cite this version:
Manuel Munier, Vincent Lalanne, Magali Ricarde. Self-Protecting Documents for Cloud Storage Se-
curity. TrustCom - 11th IEEE International Conference on Trust, Security and Privacy in Computing
and Communications - 2012, Jun 2012, Liverpool, United Kingdom. pp.1231-1238, ￿10.1109/Trust-
Com.2012.261￿. ￿hal-00736133￿
Self-Protecting Documents for Cloud Storage Security
Manuel Munier, Vincent Lalanne
LIUPPA
Univ Pau & Pays Adour
Mont de Marsan, France
Email: {manuel.munier, vincent.lalanne}@univ-pau.fr
Magali Ricarde
BackPlan Company
Project Communication Control
Pau, France
Email: magali.ricarde@backplan.fr
Abstract—Information security is currently one of the most
important issues in information systems. This concerns the
conﬁdentiality of information but also its integrity and avail-
ability. The problem becomes even more difﬁcult when several
companies are working together on a project and that the
various documents "go out of" their respective information
systems. We propose an architecture in which the documents
themselves ensure their security and thus can be exchanged
over uncontrolled resources such as cloud storage or even USB
ﬂash drives. For this we encapsulate within the document itself
some security components (e.g. access control, usage control)
to achieve an autonomic document architecture for Enterprise
DRM (E-DRM). Using such self-protecting documents, a com-
pany can ensure security and privacy for its documents when
outsourcing storage services (e.g. cloud).
Keywords- self-protecting document; autonomic document;
usage control; E-DRM; cloud storage security;
I. INTRODUCTION
Information security is currently one of the most im-
portant issues in information systems. Security criteria
most commonly used are conﬁdentiality (assurance that
information is shared only among authorized persons or
organizations), integrity (assurance that the information is
authentic and complete), availability (assurance that the
systems responsible for delivering, storing and processing
information are accessible when needed, by those who need
them) and traceability (ability to chronologically interrelate
uniquely identiﬁable entities in a way that is veriﬁable).
The problem becomes even more difﬁcult if a user wants to
export a document from the information system to work of-
ﬂine, for example, or to broadcast it to other persons outside
the company. Drawing on the object-oriented approaches,
we chose to encapsulate in the document itself some security
components to achieve an autonomic data management
architecture for Enterprise Digital Rights Management (E-
DRM).
New technologies (ADSL, laptops, smartphones,
tablets,. . . ) have provided us with new technical means
to communicate but have also created new needs. For
example, information must be accessible at any time
(possibly ofﬂine); using a centralized site for the exchange
is seen as a constraint (client-server architecture vs.
peer-to-peer architecture); data are stored on USB ﬂash
drives and used on untrusted computers (available on open
access); we carry our data in our smartphones and share
them via (possibly unsecured) wireless communications like
3G, wiﬁ or bluetooth; cloud storage provides a platform
for connected devices (laptops, smartphones, tablets,. . . )
to access data without the need to store it locally on the
device. Obviously, these new practices raise some issues
related to information security.
Besides the technical aspects of these exchanges of in-
formation, their contents have changed. Data are more
and more complex (notions of structured documents, whole
archives, or even complete projects). Nowadays, public
data are sometimes combined with more conﬁdential data
(notion of access restriction). The content provider may wish
to control how the user is handling the content (concepts
of usage control, DRM). This can cover both the con-
sultation of information (access control, data presentation)
and its modiﬁcations (access control, management of data
consistency, logging and/or creation of metadata, update
management).
To ensure information security companies typically de-
ploy an information system responsible for providing a
network storage and access (and possibly usage) controls.
The implementation of such a platform, however, requires
certain resources (human and technical). Companies are
sometimes tempted to outsource the storage of their data:
cloud, data center,. . . But one important consideration
regarding cloud storage is security. This has also been
one of the major obstacles to a larger adoption of cloud
storage: clients aren’t likely to entrust their data to another
company without a guarantee that they’ll be able to access
their information whenever they want and no one else will be
able to get at it. To secure data, most systems use techniques
like encryption (they use a complex algorithm to encode
information; to decode the encrypted ﬁles, a user needs
the encryption key), authentication processes (the system
requires to create a user name and password), authorization
practices (the client lists the people who are authorized
to access information stored on the cloud system; many
corporations have multiple levels of authorization). Even
with these protective measures in place, many people worry
that data saved on a remote storage system is vulnerable.
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There’s always the possibility that a hacker will ﬁnd an
electronic back door and access data. Works exist about
security issues in cloud storage [1], [2], [3], [4], or more
generally in cloud computing [5], [6], [7].
In this paper we propose an innovative approach that aims
to make documents self-secure so they can be stored even on
untrusted servers: we encapsulate within the document both
the data it carries and the security mechanisms to control the
use of such data. Thus security constraints can be (partially)
relaxed on the server since all information is encrypted and
only the security kernel of the document can access them.
Using such self-protecting documents, a company can ensure
security and privacy for its documents when outsourcing
storage services (eg cloud).
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows:
Section II presents our motivations for the design of a new
E-DRM architecture based on autonomic documents; this
section also presents a concrete case study that we developed
with our partner company BackPlanTM 1; in Section III we
describe our autonomic document approach and we give
some details about the metadata and the usage control
mechanisms; Sections IV and V outline our current work
about cloud storage and security issues, and then conclude
this paper.
II. MOTIVATIONS
In the area of collaborative work, the partners are required
to consult but also to modify the documents. It is therefore
necessary to implement security mechanisms that go beyond
a simple access control: usage control (how partners can use
a document: obligations, workﬂows, delegation rules,. . . ),
information consistency management (e.g. some documents
may reference others), traceability (monitoring of actions,
metadata attached to information),. . . This is the role of
the Information System which is the core of the company
or project.
A. Architecture
However, centralized architectures for information sharing
(Fig.1) have two drawbacks compared to the use of tradi-
tional documents:
1) Work on protected documents requires the user to
connect to a server responsible for enforcing the
security policy. This server hosts all the documents
and controls all user actions. Users can not directly
exchange information: all the exchanges have to go
through this server.
2) These security mechanisms require installation, on the
user side, of applications and/or proprietary modules
to be able to handle such documents. The user
becomes dependent on the security provider for his/her
applications.
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Figure 1. Document security enforced on server side
These are the two ﬁndings that led us to propose a new
E-DRM architecture inspired by object-oriented concepts
where the document becomes an autonomous operating
entity able to control by itself how the information it contains
can be accessed and used (Fig.2). Such a document is a kind
of information system on its own embedding both a data
warehouse and various security modules (access control,
usage control, metadata,. . . ).
 

			

			





Figure 2. Autonomic document self-manages its security
This allows users to exchange such documents safely, or
even portions of documents. Moreover, security constraints
are relaxed on the server side since the documents them-
selves provide their own security. The server will only be
used to synchronize versions of documents exchanged by
partners.
B. Sample Application
Consider an Oil & Gas project as the construction of
a pipeline or an oil installation. The information system
1BackPlanTM , Project Communication Control
http://www.backplan.fr
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consists of numerous documents, it has a central role, its
structure and development evolve along with the progress of
the project: the documentation must always precede action
(design, work procedures). Documentation is a requirement
at the closure of the project along with veriﬁcations (records,
the minutes,. . . ). The document evolves at the same rate as
the project. These documents are speciﬁcations, drawings,
records of expertise, procedures, records,. . .
1) Business Aspects: Such a project obviously involves
many partners and subcontractors. Here is a representative
example of a project timeline:
• 1st level design: this step is performed by the land
surveyor who makes a topographical survey of the site
where the work will be done.
• 2nd level design: is the design phase of the project itself,
and is performed by an engineering company that will
plan the work and the construction will be launched
from this plan. This level involves various partners:
civil engineering, pipeﬁtters, instrumentation engneer-
ing, utilities,. . . These documents are usually schemes
that can have many levels or layers, each company or
sector can thus share the same document. This stage
ends with all engineering documents validated by the
stamp "Approved for construction".
• Construction phase: it is based on engineering doc-
uments and work procedures. It comes with many
documents that are intended to demonstrate compliance
of the book in terms of quality and regulatory standards
(e.g. multiﬂuid standard, water code, capacity under
pressure).
• At the end of construction the land surveyor will come
again, and verify the topographic survey: this is a
control operation of a project to verify the differences
from the planned location and update the data (to know
where everything is). The engineering documents then
pass status "As built". This operation can also update
the geographic information system (GIS) of the place.
As we have stated, the partners will handle many doc-
uments. There can also occur unforeseen circumstances
during the project. Here are some identiﬁed difﬁculties and
problems:
1) Several actors in various ﬁelds must work on the same
document. Take for example the passage of a pipe
under a river: the land surveyor made the survey, but
it’s not him who knows the techniques of drilling,
centering techniques and the radii of curvature of the
pipe. These characteristics are a function of pipe
diameter, its alloy or its proﬁle,. . . In 2nd level study
partners will therefore have to reﬁne the study of a 1st
level.
2) The recordings are very numerous during the construc-
tion. For example: inspection of welds. The sections
of pipe are welded every 12 to 15m. These welds
should be checked: radiography, analysis by a certiﬁed
individual, hydraulic tests. These controls are spread
over time and generate many records that are, once
made, a legal value.
3) The code requirements to be applied are numerous and
speciﬁc whatever the project: standards and regula-
tions, good practice guides, internal standards,. . . As
part of the quality approach, journals are provided
to verify that these code requirements are taken into
account. It is recommended to involve the regulatory
bodies in these reviews. Unfortunately, these doc-
uments are currently independent of each other (in
terms of information system).
4) Consequences for digital documents: whether for of-
ﬁce or mobile use (eg tablet or laptop on a site with no
network coverage), the dependence on the document
registry can be restrictive (even by a checkout of ﬁles
for ofﬂine viewing). It would be more convenient to
group all the information in one document, structured
and secure, so that different partners can exchange it
directly (and synchronize it occasionally with a server
to "publish" their work).
2) Security Aspects: We propose to improve the security
of information in two directions: metadata management and
usage control.
Metadata: It could be used to "bind" reviews, cer-
tiﬁcations, and other minutes to design documents within
the information system (see item 3 above). The aim is to
improve traceability, both in the design process (concept
of workﬂow) in case of litigation (concept of proof of
conformity, digital forensics). Take for example a phase
control such as checking the welding of a pipe (see item 2
above), it would be interesting to use metadata to improve
the traceability of the process for purposes of validation
and/or evidence: photos geotagged (to certify checkpoints),
metadata associated with the plans,. . . Since several
partners are working on such a project, everyone could also
attach some metadata to the information: conﬁdence and
trustworthiness indicators, impact risk of a change,. . . ). This
metadata would permit to calculate various performance
indicators for monitoring the partners’ tasks or metadata to
the information they produce.
Usage control: Here are some examples of security
rules that we would implement to control how partners use
documents:
• It is possible to write a deliverable of the project only if
conﬁdence in the various technical documents exceeds
a certain threshold. It is a dynamic access control based
on trust (whether in a document or a partner).
• The security rules may prohibit access to parts of the
document based on location data. This prevents, for
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example, on a site (or train) an unknown person takes
sensitive information over the shoulder of someone.
The same argument could be used for putting visual
ﬁlters in place (blur, masking, wrong information,. . . ).
• A responsive access control may require a partner (or
subcontractor), via a mechanism of pre-obligation to
accept the terms of a contract (non-disclosure agree-
ment, delegation of responsibility, deadlines,. . . ) before
accessing a plan and contribute to the design.
• A user control would be to require a partner to complete
parts of design documents (eg. inform the radii of
curvature of the pipe, write the study of soil before
drilling) before a deadline if he wants to stay a project
member (notions of punishment and penalty).
• The usage control can also deﬁne collective obligations.
For example, each partner must have reread each con-
cept study in which they participate at least 7 days
before the deadline for validation.
Currently, the various documents of such a project are
managed independently of each other. In the best case,
a document registry is set up to try to centralize critical
information. The use of a true information system would al-
low the implementation of such a security policy. However,
users now want to handle these documents on their laptops,
smartphones, or tablets, and using a centralized site for the
exchange is seen as an unacceptable constraint. Hence our
idea of developing self secure documents that can be stored
anywhere on the cloud or exchanged with USB ﬂash drives.
C. BackPlanTM
BackPlanTM is a French company providing document
management services and collaboration workﬂow applica-
tions to improve project communication, transparency across
the project, ability to manage schedule and risks, reliable
indicators and regulatory compliance. From the engineering
phases to the construction phases, projects involve different
companies. All of them will use the collaboration solution
BackPlanTM to ensure consistency of information across the
project and a complete audit trail of project communication.
BackPlanTM document management services are currently
provided on a server hosted in a data center: the document
registry.
However, as explained in the case study in section II-B,
the solution of a centralized information system is not
entirely satisfactory. Whether for ofﬁce or mobile use (e.g.
smartphone, tablet or laptop on a site with no network
coverage), the dependence on the document registry can be
restrictive (even by a checkout of ﬁles for ofﬂine viewing).
It would be more convenient to group all the information
in one document, structured and secure, so that different
partners can exchange it directly (and synchronize it occa-
sionally with a server to "publish" their work).
III. AUTONOMIC DOCUMENTS
Our approach is therefore to encapsulate within the docu-
ment both the data it carries and the security mechanisms to
control the use of such data. The architecture we propose for
such autonomic documents which can manage their security
autonomously is outlined in Figure 3. Here are the most
signiﬁcant components that will then be detailed in the
following subsections:
• the database for storing the contents of the document
and metadata; structured contents are represented in
terms of nodes and relationships; metadata are prop-
erties attached to these nodes and relationships
• the security kernel which is responsible for enforcing
the security policy and then monitors all actions on
the document; it relies on various security modules
dedicated to speciﬁc tasks (OrBAC for access control
and usage control, metadata management, computation
of indicators,. . . )
• embedded applications to operate on the document with
dedicated tools; embedded services and/or mechanisms
of export and import to handle the document using
legacy applications
• the license for the user (stored outside the document)
containing the permissions, prohibitions and obligations
assigned to this user; later, such a license may also
contain other directives for the kernel (and its modules),
such as metadata to be collected or context management
rules
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Figure 3. Autonomic document architecture
When the user wants to access the secure document he
must ﬁrst identify himself and provide his license which
contains the security policy rules speciﬁc to that user. These
"rules" may represent permissions, but also prohibitions,
obligations, or metadata to be collected during the user’s
actions.
The document then starts the security kernel of our archi-
tecture which will in turn initiate various security modules:
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a access control module, a metadata management module,
a trustworthiness management module, a module dedicated
to collaborative work,. . . The kernel and the modules are
conﬁgured with the rules contained in the license provided
by the user.
From that moment on, all the accesses to information
within the document is made through the security kernel.
For any action performed by the user, the kernel requests
each security module to validate this action. Some modules
will indeed conﬁrm or deny the various actions (e.g. access
control module). Others will simply add some metadata to
these actions (e.g. who performed this action, from which IP,
at what time, with which application, in which context,. . . )
so that other modules can compute their data (e.g. trustwor-
thiness indicator, collaborative work management).
The main difference to "classic" E-DRM schemes is
how and where the security mechanisms are implemented.
Traditionally, the document (or its subset that is accessible
to the user) is encrypted using player keys; decryption takes
place in a trusted viewer, which has to run securely on the
client side. The trusted viewer is responsible for enforcing
a license distributed alongside the document. If the user
updates the document, it is generally necessary to publish the
amended document on the server (Fig.1) so that another user
can access and see the changes (the server must reencrypt
the amended document). In the proposed architecture, the
document (as an object embedding both data and security
modules) is more like a decentralized part of the whole
information system. It can manage the updates made by
users and store these changes in its embedded encrypted
database. The document can be transferred directly to
another user without going through a server (Fig.2).
The second difference is that access to the document
can be done either through dedicated embedded applications
(like "lightweight" trusted viewers), or "heavy" trusted ap-
plications (using the API), or by exporting data (e.g. XML
format) to some legacy applications.
A. Information Storage
Document data are stored in the embedded database
accessible only by the security kernel. This store implements
the multi-view model for secure versioned repository as
deﬁned in our previous work [8]. In this model, information
is organized as a graph of which the nodes are connected
by relations of various kinds. We can represent XML
documents, trees like ﬁles/directories structures, project ﬁles
when certain items are dependent on other elements. Each
version of each node is kept with its own relationships.
The view of a user is a subset of this graph computed
according to his/her privileges. All user actions (accessing,
updating, creating, deleting,. . . nodes and/or relationships)
are performed with respect to his/her view. For instance,
if he/she deletes a folder that contains "hidden" ﬁles (i.e.
not available in his/her view), the execution of this action
should result in the removal of this directory in the view of
the user. This to ensure the conﬁdentiality property for other
information. Refusing the removal because "the directory is
not empty" violates this property. Accepting the removal and
deleting, as a side effect, an "unauthorized" ﬁle also presents
a problem of conﬁdentiality. The solution we adopted is to
translate each action into elementary operations at the level
of the data warehouse in terms of updates of versions of
those nodes and their relationships. This is to ensure the
integrity of the information. For instance, the "hidden" ﬁle
that belonged to the deleted directory should not become an
orphan. Since the data warehouse stores all the versions,
a user who has access to all ﬁles in the previous directory
could still access the ﬁle through the tree, but would also
be informed that the parent directory has been "deleted" by
another user (along with some ﬁles it contained).
B. Security Modules
Obviously the core of our architecture is the security
kernel. It is the document interface with the outside world:
all the actions performed by the user to handle the doc-
ument need to be done through the security kernel (like
data abstraction in object-oriented programming). From a
functional point of view it has two aims: (1) translate the
actions performed by the user about his/her view into basic
operations on the data warehouse; (2) check that the user’s
actions are in accordance with the security policy.
The ﬁrst task is therefore to translate user actions into
basic operations at the level of versions of nodes and their
relationships. We invite you to consult [8] for more details
on this section. For example, to update a node, we create
in fact a successor to the version contained in the view
of the user. Deleting a node is equivalent to an update
with the special value NULL. Moving a node results in the
creation of a new version (link in succession) but with new
relationships.
In this article we focus on the implementation of the
security policy. As we stated at the beginning of Section III,
the security kernel can be conﬁgured to use various security
modules. For now we identiﬁed three categories of modules
as they are responsible for:
• accepting or rejecting the user’s actions,
• collecting and attaching metadata to the actions,
• calculating new data as actions go along.
When the user requires the execution of an action, the
security kernel performs control in two stages. The ﬁrst is
to validate this action. For this the kernel requests each
security module to validate the action. Some modules will
indeed accept or reject the action (e.g. access control, usage
control). Others will add information to this action (e.g.
metadata). If the action is validated by all the security
modules it then enters the second stage: the processing of the
action. Basic operations implementing this action are then
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performed on the data warehouse. Then, the security kernel
broadcasts this action a second time to each security module
so they can achieve the associated processing: logging (e.g.
access control, usage control), computation of additional
information (e.g. trustworthiness management, collaborative
work management).
The ﬁrst security module that we developed belongs
to the ﬁrst category and relates to the access and usage
control to information contained in the document. From
the formal point of view we are using the OrBAC model [9]
which can express security policies in terms of permissions,
prohibitions and obligations between a subject, an object
and an action. These are the rules contained in the license
provided to the user. OrBAC model also supports the notion
of context [10], [11], [12]. Indeed, security rules in these
policies are no longer static but dynamic, depending on the
context. They must be also self-adaptive with respect to
temporal conditions, the user’s location, previous behavior
of this user, etc. . . Many works attempt to extend existing
models to deal with access control based on user’s location
context [13] or temporal context [14]. Some models are
speciﬁcally dedicated to collaborative environments (in [15]
users obtain permissions according to their role and the
team in which they are involved) or workﬂow environment
(in [16], [17] subjects gain access to required objects only
during the execution of the task). As discussed in [11],
authors use contexts in OrBAC to express different types of
extra conditions that control activation of rules speciﬁed in
the security policy:
• the Temporal context that depends on the time at which
the subject is requesting for an access to the system,
• the Spatial context that depends on the subject location,
• the User-declared context that depends on the subject
objective (or purpose),
• the Prerequisite context that depends on characteristics
that join the subject, the action and the object.
• the Provisional context that depends on previous actions
the subject has performed in the system.
Our next step was therefore to develop a second secu-
rity module to manage contexts in our architecture. By
adding context awareness to our intelligent document we can
express contextual usage control rules in security policies.
To control context activation, the embedded information
system must provide the information required to check that
conditions associated with the context deﬁnition are satisﬁed
or not. To do this, either contexts have direct access to the
host system (eg a global clock to check the temporal context)
or they use metadata carried by the actions.
A third security module has been developed and relates
precisely to metadata collection (which performs the action,
at what moment, from which IP,. . . ) and thus ensures the
traceability of actions performed on the document by the
different users. It is not yet conﬁgurable because we ﬁrst
need to deﬁne, at a license level, a language to describe the
metadata logging policy. However, collecting some prede-
ﬁned metadata, we were able to test and validate context
management and, thus, the implementation of security rules
to do usage control. One of our current work is to implement
a security module using these metadata to compute new
information (e.g. trustworthiness evaluation for information
updates as in [18], [19], [20]). Such metadata may also be
useful for providing collaborative work support as discussed
in [21], [22]. To do this we could either write a security
module either deﬁne a (provisional) context. This remains
an open question for now.
C. Opening & Using a Document
As we have previously mentioned, access to information
contained in the document can then be done in three ways:
• Export and import mechanisms (XML for example) to
manipulate information through existing applications.
This requires setting up ﬁlters at the security kernel
level to format information when exporting (check-out)
and to interpret them when importing (check-in). In this
case, the level of granularity is the whole ﬁle.
• Plugins developed for existing applications to have a
more granular level. The plugin can then talk directly
with the security kernel to interact at the nodes and
relationships level, provided of course that the user has
the appropriate privileges.
• Use of services and/or dedicated application embedded
in the secure document. During its initialization, after
starting the different security components, the docu-
ment can automatically start running a WebDAV server
(for example) in charge of presenting the information
in the document as a tree of ﬁles/directories. Access to
information can then be made from traditional applica-
tions via the WebDAV server.
D. License Contents
The last component of our architecture deals with licenses
for users. As shown in Figure 4, a license is an XML
document containing information of the server that issued
the license (the licensor), information relating to the licensee
and, of course, various security rules. Having used the
OrBAC model to implement our security module in charge
of access control and usage control, it is in this example
OrBAC rules. Compared with policy language standards
like XrML or ODRL, we also need in the future to express
how metadata should be collected and what triggers must
be deployed to manage contexts. Thus the license does
not consist only of security rules but also contains the
conﬁguration of the various security modules required for
handling the document.
To protect the contents of this license, when created, the
rules are encrypted with the user’s public key (being the only
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one who can decrypt with his/her private key and thus the
only person to know, for example, the permissions which
are granted to him/her). The license is then signed by the
issuer to prevent any further modiﬁcation.
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Figure 4. License contents
As we mentioned since the beginning of this article, our
approach relies on the concept of metadata for traceability,
context activation (dynamic security rules) and, eventually,
computation of indicators (collaborative work management).
Some of this metadata can however raise privacy issues:
user’s location, trustworthiness indicator,. . . One of our
perspectives is to deﬁne in the license metadata to be
collected and for what purposes it will be used. From a legal
standpoint, the license will be a user agreement to work on
the document.
IV. CLOUD STORAGE
To build our ﬁrst prototype of autonomic document based
E-DRM platform we used standard USB ﬂash drives with
an auto-run conﬁguration to launch Java programs. The
ﬂash drive represents the document and can be exchanged
(physically) between different users. It brings together
on the same "support" a database and several executables
(security kernel, security modules, embedded services and
applications). Such an architecture can run on various
operating systems (Microsoft Windows, Linux,. . . ). The
only assumptions about the host computer are the availability
of a Java virtual machine and enabling the auto-run for
removable media. As the user can directly access ﬁles on
the USB ﬂash drive, and thus in particular to storage ﬁles
of the database, we encrypted the content of the latter. Thus
"raw" information of our document, which might be reached
in bypassing the security kernel, is unusable.
This prototype is primarily a proof of concept. The
details of "internal" mechanisms such as secret credentials
embedded in the security kernel, correct execution of the
kernel, ciphering used (embedded database, license contents,
communications between the document and external applica-
tions,. . . ) are beyond the scope of this paper. We obviously
have implemented these mechanisms to experiment our
approach, but this part of our work requires further study
(e.g. using ISO/IEC 27005:2011 information security risk
management approach [23]).
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Figure 5. Self-protecting documents in cloud storage
The next step is to develop a storage server on the
cloud (Figure 5). This means specifying primitives read
(export of a full project document or portion of a document)
and write (merging changes made by the partners). This
server will also be responsible for distributing licenses and
pushing any updates to the security policy. In fact, as
with USB ﬂash drives, security constraints can be (partially)
relaxed on the server since all information is encrypted
and only the security kernel can access them to merge the
updates. Using such self-protecting documents, a company
can ensure security and privacy for its documents even when
outsourcing storage services (e.g. cloud).
V. CONCLUSIONS
The architecture of self-protecting documents presented
in this paper is currently in the prototype stage. We were
able to represent various types of information: tree of ﬁles
and directories, structured documents in XML (detailed
node by node), all ﬁles in a project with their dependency
relationships. This allowed us to validate, at ﬁrst, our data
warehouse model based on a multi-view approach.
We integrated the OrBAC engine and using metadata
and contexts we are currently implementing new security
modules speciﬁcally dedicated to usage control (e.g. trust-
worthiness evaluation for information updates, traceability
of changes, collaborative work management, schedule and
risks management,. . . ). For this we use existing works found
in [19], [10], [24], [25], [21].
As explained in section II-B many projects involves sev-
eral companies, and these companies are increasingly faced
with the following dilemma: they want to strengthen con-
trols over the use of their documents, but these documents
must also be "dispersed" among users and therefore outside
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the information system of the company. We are conﬁdent
that the self-protecting document architecture presented in
this paper is a solution to these new needs. It allows a
user to forward the document to another user who handles
the document according to his own license. It is no longer
necessary to have a centralized server to handle static
documents. We only need a drop point (e.g. outsourced
cloud storage service) to synchronize the various autonomic
documents.
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